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Limitations on Municipal Use of Parking Meters
The parking meter has become as familiar a sight in urban business
districts as the hitching post was at the turn of the century. The
device has been installed in over 1,115 cities to help meet the problem
of inadequate parking facilities in congested business areas.1 While
a policeman is still necessary to issue traffic tickets to violators, the
parking meter has a clear edge in efficiency over the older method of
marking tires with chalk and then checking later to see if any chalk
marked cars have exceeded the posted parking limit.2
Although desirable from an administrative standpoint, parking
meter ordinances have been attacked vigorously, and sometimes success-
fully, in the court 8 The usual arguments advanced are that: (1) the
municipality has no power under its charter to install parking meters;
(2) the ordinances are "revenue measures" under the guise of "police
regulation"; (3) the public right to free use of the highway is infringed;.
(4) the right of an abutting landowner to reasonable access to his
property is denied; and (5) parking meters have no reasonable relation
to traffic control. However, after twelve years of litigation,4 the validity
of such ordinances as reasonable police regulations has been estab-
lished, with limitations, by appellate decisions in twenty-seven states.5
11949 Municipal Year Book 437. The figure includes only cities over 5,000 in
population. In 1935 only four cities had installed parking meters while in 1948 they
were newly installed in 188 municipalities. Ibid.
2 Parking turnover in the metropolitan area of Portland, Oregon increased fifty
per cent after the installation of parking meters. Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321,
340, 162 P. (2d) 371 (1945). See also City of Decatur v. Robinson, 251 Ala. 99,
108, 36 So. (2d) 673 (1948).
S Parking meter ordinances have been held invalid in five states. City of Birming-
ham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114 (1937) (violation of
deed dedicating streets to the public, due process, revenue measure); Brodkey v.
Sioux City, 291 N.W. 171, modified in 229 Iowa 1291, 296 N.W. 352 (1941) (lack
of authority); City of Shreveport v. Brister, 194 La. 615, 194 So. 566 (1939) (lack
of authority); Rhodes v. Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 9 SXE. (2d) 389 (1940) (revenue
measure, no relation to parking control); In re Opinion to House of Representa-
tives, 62 R.I. 347, 5 A. (2d) 455 (1939) (lack of delegated authority). However,
the Birmingham case was recently overruled in City of Decatur v. Robinson, 251
Ala. 99, 36 So. (2d) 673 (1948) and the various legislatures have at least partially
overcome the cases in the other states. Infra, note 8.
4 The first reported case concerning the validity of parking meters is State v.
McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314, decided December 10, 1936.
5Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Texas, Washington, West Virginia. Leading cases: State v. Mc-
Carthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936); Owens v. Owens, 193 S.C. 260, 8 S.E.
(2d) 339 (1940); Kimmel v. City of Spokane, 7 Wash. (2d) 372, 109 P. (2d) 1069
(1941). For general discussion see Grimes, Legality of Parking Meter Ordinances
(1947). 35 Calif. L. Rev. 235; Conrad and Aberg, Validity of Parking Meter Ordi-
nances (1943) 29 Va. L. Rev. 617.
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Delegation of Power to Municipalities
In legal contemplation a municipal corporation exists as an instrument
of the state and can exercise only the powers expressly granted by the
state legislature or those necessarily incident to such a specified power.8
Typical municipal charters usually include authority to regulate the
use of streets, traffic or parking, and to enact general police regula-
tions but do not expressly authorize the municipality to install and
maintain parking meters.7 Most courts have been liberal in reading
authority to enact parking meter ordinances in the general language of
the statutes. Nevertheless, a few states have removed doubts by passing
enabling acts specifically authorizing municipalities to install parking
meters.8 Although not necessary in the usual case, such statutes are
advisable where municipal powers are. unusually narrow or there is
a possibly conflicting state statute. Direct appeal to the electorate,
as opposed to legislation, is not without risk, however, as illustrated
by the North Dakota experience. There the voters approved a disabling
statute9 after the state supreme court had upheld the validity of a
parking meter ordinance.' 0
In the few cases invalidating parking meter ordinances, lack of
delegated authority has been a principal factor."' However, in those
cases, except for one case involving a special restrictive statute,
12
the courts regarded the ordinances as primarily revenue measures and
therefore subject to the strict construction given municipal taxing
power. 13 If the ordinances had been considered as primarily concerned
with the regulation of parking and thus referable to the police power,
different conclusions might have resulted. Many of the courts upholding
parking meter ordinances have assumed that if the ordinance was
a revenue measure it would be invalid for lack of a specific grant of
power to levy the tax.14
6 City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ill. 347, 352, 45 N.E. (2d) 852 (1943);
Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas and Oil Co., 80 Utah 530, 534, 15 P. (2d) 648 (1932).
General rules for implying municipal powers are set forth in 2 MeQuillin, Municipal
Corporations (3d ed. 1949) §10.12.
7 Bowers v. City of Muskegon, 305 Mich. 676, 9 N.W. (2d) 889 (1943); Kimmel
v. City of Spokane, 7 Wash. (2d) 372, 109 P. (2d) 1069 (1941). For home rule see
Harper v. City of Wichita Falls, 105 S.W. (2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
820 Iowa Code Anno. (1949) §390.7; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1949) §94.740; La. Stats.
Anno. (Dart 1949 Supp.) §5220.5; Mo. Rev. Stat. §8395 (as amended 1943); North
Carolina Stats. (1943) §160-200, subs. 31; N.H. Laws, 1947, c. 74; 62A McKinney,
Laws of N.Y. §54 (as amended 1940). In Rhode Island the practice is to authorize
parking meters for particular cities. Rhode Island Laws, 1947, chapters 1830, 1889,
1904.
9 Initiative measure, Laws 1948, c. 357, approved at election of June 29, 1948.
Held constitutional in City of Fargo v. Sathre, - N.D. ., 36 N.W. (2d) 39
(1949).
'0 State ex rel Dryer v. Brekke, 75 N.D. 468, 28 N.W. (2d) 598 (1947).
11 Cases cited supra note 3.
12 City of Shreveport v. Brister, 194 La. 615, 194 So. 566 (1939). The statute
restricted municipal power to levy taxes or licenses under the police power to those
activities taxed by the state.
181"... the meter charge is, in reality, an excise tax for the privilege of using
the parking space and, hence, a revenue measure." Rhodes v. Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627,
9 S.E. (2d) 389, 392 (1940). See 2 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) §507 on strict
construction of the power to tax.
14"The ordinance must stand if a regulation and fall if a tax." Hendrick's v.
City of Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 151, 154, 290 N.W. 428 (1940). See also Cassidy v.
City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 33 A. (2d) 142 (1943); Wilhoit v. City of




The main point of argument in the cases has been whether parking
meter ordinances are in fact primarily police regulations or revenue
measures. Actually parking meters have appealed to municipalities
both as a means of regulating and increasing the fluidity of automobile
traffic in congested areas and as a substantial source of revenue.1.5 The
majority of the courts considering the problem have probably been
influenced by a desire to uphold the measures on policy grounds and
have emphasized the regulatory aspects. It is often stated that a
recitation in the ordinance that the municipality is exercising its police
power, although not conclusive, is entitled to great weight, and the
burden is on the party challenging the ordinance to prove that it is
primarily a revenue measure.'
6
According to the regulatory view, the public has a primary right
to free travel on the streets, but this does not carry with it the right
to store a vehicle on the street.17 Parking is not an incident to travel;
it is a privilege granted by the municipality and subject to reasonable
police regulation.' 8 The parking meter is considered a reasonable
means of accomplishing a permitted end, parking regulation, and the
meter charge is merely an incidental license fee sufficient to cover the
expense of maintaining the regulation.' 9
-As a- revenue measure, the meter charge becomes a tax for the use
of the streets, subject to attack on the basis of lack of municipal power
to levy the particular tax and the constitutional requirement that all
members of the same class be taxed alike.20 Furthermore, although
the rights and privileges of the public and of abutting land owners
yield to reasonable police regulation, it. does not necessarily follow that
the exercise of those rights and privileges is subject to taxation.
Whether such an exercise of the taxing power is valid, assuming authority
15 In City of Fargo v. Sathre, , N.D. -, 36 N.W. (2d) 39, 50 (1949), up-
holding the constitutionality of a disabling measure, supra note 12, the court stated:
"Though the [parking meter] ordinance purports to be a purely regulatory meas-
ure it requires no legal Sherlock Holmes to penetrate the disguise and discern that
it is also a revenue producing measure." See also Harper v. City of Wichita Falls,
105 S.W. (2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
16 Hendricks v. City of Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 151, 290 N.W. 428 (1940); Lau-
bach & Sons v. City of Easton, 347 Pa. 542, 32 A. (2d) 881 (1943). The general
rule is that the court will not look behind the ordinance and inquire into motives in
the absence of fraud, corruption, oppression or gross abuse. 2 MeQuillin, Municipal
Corporations (3d ed. 1949) §§10.35, 10.37.
17 Harper v. City of Wichita Falls, 105 S.W. (2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937);
Owens v. Owens, 193 S.C. 260, 8 S.E. (2d) 339 (1940).
18 Andrews v. City of Marion, 221 Ind. 422, 47 N.E. (2d) 968 (1943); Glodt v.
City of Missoula, - Mont. -, 190 P. (2d) 545 (1948). It is difficult to under-
stand why courts subjugate the individual's entire interest by referring to parking
on the streets as a privilege. If parking is truly only a- privilege there would seem
to be no reason why parking regulations must be reasonable and logical extension
of the idea is not satisfying. Perhaps it has not been realized that if parking on
the street is regarded as an incident of travel and a right it would still be subject
to reasonable xegulation for the public good.
19 Cases cit d supra motes 17 and 18.
20 The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
state shall deny "... to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." This has been interpreted to mean that a tax classification must not be
arbitrary and the tax must not discriminate between persons or property in the
same class. Kansas City So. Ry. v. Road Improvement District No. 6, 256 U.S. 658
(1921). See generally 1 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) §§330-350.
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to tax would depend on the scope of due process2 ' and whether
automobiles parked in a business area represent a reasonable classifica-
tion justifying discrimination against that group as compared to
automobile owners generally. While it has been suggested that approval
under the police power of a license tax limited to such a class implies
that it meets these constitutional requirements,2 2 such a conclusion is
very tenuous at best.
28
The advantage of justifying parking meter installation under a
revenue theory is that it releases the municipality from the various
restrictions on the amount of the meter charges and use of the revenue
obtained which are imposed under the police regulation approach.
However, due to the liberal attitude of the courts in their interpretation
of expenses of maintaining the regulation, to be discussed, together with
the political implications, 24 the revenue theory will probably not be
pressed upon the courts. No city has tried to date and the ordinance
usually recites that it is passed to regulate parking.
25
Judicial Limitations
Inasmuch as parking meter ordinances are regarded as police regula-
tions, with the meter charge as merely an incidental fee, they are
subject to the appurtenant limitation of reasonableness. 26 Although
the allowable area of municipal use of parking meters has not been
established with exactness, certain general restrictions are apparent-
from the decisions. The principal limitations are: (1) receipts must
be used to further some aspect of traffic control; (2) the meter charge
must be reasonable; (3) the parking meter zone selected must bear a
legitimate relation to traffic control; and, (4) the ordinance must,
expressly or impliedly, exclude stops for actual loading or unloading
of vehicles.
The accepted doctrine that the power to regulate implies a power
to charge a fee sufficient to meet the expense of maintaining the regula-
tion 27 has been broadly applied to parking meter ordinances. The
receipts may be used to install, maintain, and police the parking
meters, 28 and it has been held that expenditures for street cleaning,
general traffic control, and street construction within the municipality
21 Due process of law is constantly raised in tax cases and rarely discussed except
where notice and hearing are involved. 1 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) 331. How-
ever, "due process" is readily available if the court wants to use it. See City of
Birmingham v. Hood McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114 (1937).
22 Comment (1938) 4 Ohio St. L.J. 198.
23 The argument is based on the statement in 4 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924)
§1685 that the same rules as to classification apply to license taxes under the police
power as to regular taxes. The statement is not supported by citations and the
courts have not discussed the subject in parking meter cases.
24 As a public relations matter many motorists probably resent the present nickel
parking meters. Their attitude would not be improved by admitting that parking
meters are primarily revenue devices.
25 Andrews v. City of Marion, 221 Ind. 422, 47 N.E. (2d) 968 (1943).
26 An ordinance may be valid as to its general purposes but unreasonable in a
particular application. 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 1949) 395 and
cases cited.
27 Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas & Oil Co., 80 Utah 530, 15 P. (2d) 648 (1932).
28 City of Louisville v. Louisville Automobile Club, 290 Ky. 241, 160 S.W. (2d)
663 (1942); Owens v. Owens, 193 S.C. 260, 8 S.E. (2d) 339 (1940).
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are permissible.29 In a recent case the city's contention that it should
be able to charge off against parking meter funds part of the expense
of maintaining the various departments of city government including
depreciation on city buildings was upheld under an ordinance specifying
income was to be used for general traffic regulation.80 Generally,
however, the courts have said that expenditures unrelated to some
aspect of. traffic control would not be sanctioned.81
Theoretically there is a limit to the meter charge which may be
exacted; it must be reasonably related to the cost of the automobile and
thing to be accomplished.82 As no ease has come before the appellate
courts involving a charge of more than five cents for one hour of parking,
it is not settled whether a greater charge is permissible, but the deter-
mination by the municipality of a proper fee is entitled to a presumption
of reasonableness. 83 The most substantial danger, from a municipal
point of view, is that overall receipts will be so great that the ordinance
will be deemed a revenue measure and not a parking regulation.
8 4
However, receipts of $1,145,305.81 over a six year period with a parking
meter purchase and maintenance expense of $221,810.73 have been
approved where the surplus was spent or earmarked for general traffic
control.8
5
In addition, a parking regulation must bear a reasonable relation
to the evil which is to be corrected.86 By the weight of authority
parking meter zones in business areas of a municipality are. reasonable
because of the recognized lack of downtown parking space and need"
for rapid turnover in the available street parking facilities.8 7 The
relationship to traffic control becomes obscured in less congested areas
and several courlts have indicated placement of parking meters in
more outlying areas would be unreasonable. 38 Probably the high cost
of meters will act as a self deterring force to prevent any such action
on the part of municipal authorities.
The fourth limitation arises from the doctrine that a property
owner fronting on a public street has a right to reasonable ingress
and egress to his property and, as a member of the public, has the
right to load or unload a vehicle as a necessary incident to the right
29 Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P. (2d) 371 (1945); Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 94 N.H. 501, 51 A. (2d) 836 (1947).
30 De Aryan v. City of San Diego, 75 Cal. App. (2d) 292, 170 P. (2d) 482 (1946).
31 Cases cited suprn note 29.
32 Fosters' Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P. (2d) 721 (1941); Hickey v.
Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P. (2d) 371 (1945).
83 Harper v. City of Wichita Falls, 105 S.W. (2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
34Wilhoit v. City of Springfield, 237 Mo. App. 775, 171 S.W. (2d) 95 (1943).
The amount of the license fee is evidence whether the measure is in reality a regu-
latory or a revenue measure, 4 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924). §1786. The argument
is made in virtually all of the parking meter cases.
35 Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P. (2d) 371 (1945).
36 Haggenjos v. Chicago, 336 IlL. 573, 168 N.E. 661 (1929); 1.ugh v. City of
Des Moines, 176 Iwa 593, 156 N.W. 892 (1916).
37 Andrews v. City of Marion, 221 Ind. 422, 47 N.E. (2d) 968 (1943); Kimmel
v. City of Spokane, 7 Wash. (2d) 372, 109 P. (2d) 1069 (1941). The court took
judicial notice of parking conditions in Harper v. City of Wichita Falls, 105 S.W.
(2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
38 State v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 440, 171 So. 314 (1936); Webster County
Court v. Roman, 121 W. Va. 381, 387, 3 S.E. (2d) 631, 634 (1939) (concurring
opinion).
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